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1 Introduction
Assistance to people in emergencies can sometimes
be appropriately provided in the form of cash,
enabling people to decide for themselves what they
most need and to buy it in local markets. The debate
around the appropriate use of cash in emergencies
has often been framed, as it is here, as one between
cash and food. It is important to remember that cash
is not just an alternative to food aid but to all forms
of in-kind assistance. However, as food aid often
dominates humanitarian responses, deciding when
cash is appropriate as an alternative or complement
to food aid is clearly important.
Recent years have seen a rapid growth in the use of
cash-based responses in emergencies. Governments
in Thailand, India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia provided
cash support in response to the Indian Ocean
tsunami in 2004, and the Pakistan government
provided substantial cash assistance to households
affected by the Kashmir earthquake of 2005. Aid
agencies have included cash as an alternative to food
aid, to enable people to rebuild houses or find
temporary shelter, as well as large-scale cash-for-
work and cash grants to enable people to rebuild
their livelihoods (Adams and Winahyu 2006; Harvey
2007).
2 When is cash appropriate?
Typically, questions around cash are presented in
terms of its supposed advantages and disadvantages
as against commodity approaches. We argue that
this is unhelpful: it often presents theoretical
drawbacks to cash which may not be borne out in
practice, and it tends to suggest that advantages and
disadvantages are fixed, rather than context-specific.
2.1 Economics
Any kind of resource transfer will impact on markets
and local economies. A central question around cash
transfers is how effectively markets will be able to
respond to an injection of cash. Put simply, will
people be able to buy what they need at reasonable
prices? There is certainly a need for caution in
assuming that this will be the case. Markets in
developing countries are often weak and poorly
integrated, and may be particularly constrained or
disrupted in conflicts and during natural disasters.
This requires a capacity to analyse markets at local,
national and regional levels, both in the assessment
process and in ongoing monitoring (Adams and
Harvey 2006).
2.2 Nutrition
One of the arguments sometimes put forward for
food aid is that it is likely to have a greater nutritional
impact, so is more appropriate if a project has
explicitly nutritional objectives. This might be
possible, for instance, if food aid is fortified to
address particular vitamin or mineral deficiencies. But
there is also evidence that cash can be as effective as
food aid in supporting nutrition. An evaluation of the
World Food Programme’s (WFP) cash transfer pilot
project in Sri Lanka found that ‘a switch from food
to cash benefits was not likely to affect consumption
significantly’ (Sharma 2006). Where cash is more
cost-effective than food aid, the slightly greater
marginal propensity to consume food aid may be
outweighed by the greater cost-effectiveness of
cash.
2.3 Implementation
Agencies are often reluctant to consider cash-based
responses because of a perception that they may be
more vulnerable to corrupt diversion, looting or
theft. Assessing whether cash can be delivered safely
by agencies, and spent safely by recipients, is key and
there are clear concerns about giving people cash in
the context of conflict. Evidence from cash and
voucher projects suggests that ways can be found to
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deliver and distribute cash safely even in conflict
environments; in some situations, cash has been less
prone to diversion than in-kind alternatives.
Corruption and security risks associated with cash
should perhaps most helpfully be viewed as
different, rather than necessarily greater or smaller,
Harvey Cash-based Responses in Emergencies80
Box 1 Key issues in comparing cash and in-kind assistance
Cost-effectiveness: cash programmes are likely to have lower transport and logistics costs. However,
there may be other costs, for instance for additional finance staff. Whether a cash grant is more cost-
effective will depend on the price of goods in local markets compared with the price an aid agency
would have to pay to deliver the same goods.
Security risks: the attractiveness of cash may create risks both for staff transporting cash and for
recipients. Conversely, cash may be less visible than in-kind aid, and there may be ways of distributing
it that reduce security risks.
Corruption and diversion risks: cash may be more attractive than in-kind assistance, and so may be
particularly vulnerable to being captured by elites. It may also be more prone to diversion, particularly
where corruption is high, and to seizure by armed groups in conflicts. On the other hand, it may be
possible to deliver cash more securely than in-kind aid, and the risks of diversion or looting during
procurement and transport may be avoided.
‘Anti-social use’: cash can be used to buy anything. Some of the cash received may be used for anti-
social purposes, such as buying alcohol. Equally, though, in-kind assistance can be sold and used anti-
socially.
Gender: concerns that cash may disadvantage women because they have less say in how it is spent
than with in-kind assistance have largely not been realised. Where cash is specifically targeted at
women, it sometimes gives them greater voice within the household. The gender-specific impacts of
cash need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Choice, flexibility and dignity: cash allows recipients to decide what they should spend the money
on. This allows people to choose what they most need, and for this to vary from person to person.
Greater choice may help to foster dignity in the receipt of assistance.
Market impacts: any kind of resource transfer will affect markets and local economies. In deciding
whether to provide cash or in-kind assistance, these effects need to be assessed. The main risk of cash
transfers is that they will cause or contribute to inflation in the prices of key goods. On the other
hand, cash transfers are likely to have positive impacts on local economies through multiplier effects,
and are less likely than in-kind transfers to discourage local trade or production.
Consumption/nutrition: food aid can be fortified to address micronutrient deficiencies. Cash may
promote dietary diversity by enabling people to buy a wider range of foodstuffs.
Targeting: because cash is attractive to everybody, it may be more difficult to target, as even the
wealthy will want to be included. In practice, targeting cash projects does not seem to be more
problematic than targeting in-kind assistance.
Skills and capacity: implementing cash projects requires different skills and capacities. Logistics are
often simpler, but there may be a need for additional finance capacity. Assessments and monitoring
need to include analysis of markets. Both cash and in-kind assistance still require a focus on targeting,
registration, robust distribution systems and transparency and accountability.
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than those associated with in-kind transfers. Some
key risks associated with in-kind distributions
relating to the transport and storage of bulky
commodities do not apply in the same way to cash
transfers. The use of banks and other financial
institutions potentially reduces the security and
corruption risks associated with cash transfers.
Where banks do not exist, aid agencies have been
able to use a variety of innovative delivery
mechanisms, including mobile banking services, sub-
contracted security companies and remittance and
money transfer companies (Ali et al. 2005).
2.4 Politics and attitudes
Given the arguments in favour of cash-based
responses, why have agencies remained so reluctant to
use cash? The structure of the humanitarian system
seems to inhibit consideration of cash and voucher
responses. In the UN system, cash-based approaches
are almost completely absent, perhaps because the
dominant operational agency (WFP) provides food aid.
This is part of a wider debate about the dominance of
food aid in current humanitarian responses, and the
extent to which this is due to the continued tying of
aid to food surpluses in donor countries. There are,
however, recent signs of movement in this respect,
with WFP piloting cash-based responses in a number
of countries. The reluctance to consider cash is also
related to the underlying attitudes and assumptions
that humanitarian aid practitioners have towards the
people that they are trying to help. There is a sense in
which cash is threatening. Partly, this is about a loss of
control; giving people money involves a transfer of
choice from the agency to the affected population.
More prosaically, aid agencies still sometimes lack the
skills and expertise to implement cash approaches.
The number of people with experience of cash
projects is expanding as the number of cash
responses increases and people learn on the job.
Manuals and guidelines are also starting to be
developed (Creti and Jaspars 2006; Rauch and
Scheurer 2003). There is, however, a need to guard
against creating ‘cash experts’, and to avoid over-
complicating what should be the fundamentally
simple task of giving people money. Cash should not
be seen as a sector in its own right, but as a
mechanism that needs to be considered across all
sectors of humanitarian response.
3 Conclusion
The growing importance of cash-based responses in
emergencies has potentially far-reaching
consequences for the management and delivery of
humanitarian relief. It is likely that cash-based
programming will continue to grow, probably at the
expense of in-kind mechanisms in some contexts.
That the WFP have started to consider the possible
use of cash in pilot projects in a number of countries
is hugely welcome, but food aid still too often
continues to be the default response without
sufficient consideration of alternatives, and is
continued long after it ceases to be appropriate.
Humanitarian actors, including the WFP, need to
develop the skills to assess whether cash-based
responses are appropriate, and to implement them
when they are.
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